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Abstract 
 
The Middle Eastern region is a major supplier of the world’s energy. It is also 
characterised by conflict, and is the focus of global geo-political interest both because of 
oil and the volatile nature of disputes in the region, which are perceived to have far 
reaching global security implications. Would we expect such a region to prosper? On 
the one hand, the answer should be affirmative on account of natural resource wealth, 
but on the other hand it could be negative due to the presence of conflict and the 
potential resource rent mismanagement. The actual record is somewhere in the middle. I 
argue that the region has made substantial progress in human development in spite of 
modest growth rates, which is related to the region’s cultural heritage with a low 
tolerance for poverty and inequality. Its outcome based institutional development is not 
unimpressive, which bodes well for long-term growth prospects. Additionally, recent oil 
rents have not been mismanaged. More, however, needs to be done to foster economic 
diversification and diminish dependence on natural resources. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The broadly defined Middle East; inclusive of Iran, North Africa and Central 
Asia, is home to about two-thirds of the world’s known oil reserves and about half 
of its natural gas reserves. The region is thus a major supplier of the world’s 
energy. It is also characterised by conflict in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq, and is 
the focus of global geo-political interest both because of oil and the volatile nature 
of disputes in the region, which are perceived to have far reaching global security 
implications. Other things being equal, do we expect such a region to prosper? On 
the one hand, the answer must be in the affirmative on account of its natural 
resource wealth, but on the other hand it could be in the negative due to the 
presence of conflict and the potential mismanagement of resource rents. As 
always, the true answer and economic record of the region is somewhere in the 
middle. I argue that the region has made substantial progress in human 
development in spite of modest growth rates. This may be related to the region’s 
cultural heritage, which fosters a comparatively lower tolerance for poverty and 
inequality. Its institutional development is not unimpressive, which bodes well for 
its long-term growth prospects. Moreover, there is little evidence that the recent 
oil rents have been squandered. Much more, however, needs to be done to foster 
economic diversification and diminish dependence on natural resources if long-
term growth is to be promoted.  The organisation of the paper is as follows. 
Section 2 is concerned with macroeconomic growth issues relevant to the region, 
followed by developments in poverty, inequality, human and institutional 
development in section 3. Section 4 analyses the current oil boom in the region. 
Finally, section 5 concludes by considering domestic constraints to growth.     
 
2 Economic Performance in the West Asian Region 
 
There are two economic definitions for the region.  ESCWA (Economic and 
Social Commission for West Asia, a United Nations organisation) extends from 
Iraq to Egypt, taking in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. The World Bank 
utilises a larger grouping for this region, known as MENA (Middle East and 
North Africa) including additionally Comoros, Djibouti, Iran, Libya and the 
countries of the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). In turn the Bank’s 
regional definition is made up of three categories of economies; see World Bank 
(2006). The first is described as resource poor labour abundant consisting of 
Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. The second country 
category is called resource rich and labour abundant including Algeria, Iran, Iraq, 
Syria and Yemen. The third group is named resource abundant and labour 
importing comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, 
corresponding to the Gulf cooperation council (GCC) countries. The IMF (2006) 
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has a more broad definition which includes Central Asian countries as well as 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Table 1 presents annual average growth rates in real 
GDP per-capita, decade upon decade, since 1960 for MENA countries, as and 
when data is available. 
The economies of the region are certainly not homogenous. The GCC 
countries, major oil exporters, are (or have been) high income countries, they are 
undiversified as oil accounts for a high proportion of their national income. Most 
of the other countries in the region are (lower) middle income nations, except 
Yemen and Djibouti which are low-income countries. The growth performance of 
the region since 1980 has lagged behind dynamic East Asia, and also South Asia. 
There is also some evidence that growth in the MENA region is more subject to 
volatility than in other parts of the world (Makdisi, Fattah and Limam, 2000). 
Most nations in the region appeared to have grown reasonably well in the 1960s 
and the 1970s, along with other developing countries. The 1980s represent the 
worst decade as far as growth in real per-capita income is concerned, a feature 
shared with Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, but generally the MENA 
region as a whole has been ahead of these two other developing regions. The 
growth rate for the region is below that of the developing world average for the 
1980 to 2000 period. All of the oil exporting or resource rich countries, except 
Oman, experienced negative growth. Growth also slowed down elsewhere in the 
region. But, this feature is shared with the rest of the developing world in the 
1980s; see Murshed (2004). Major oil exporters (resource rich labour importing 
countries) continued to experience negative growth in the 1990s, although it was 
less pronounced than in 1980s when oil prices initially plummeted. Other nations 
recovered, and that recovery gathered momentum with the new millennium. Even 
the major oil exporters started to enter positive growth territory, as oil prices 
started to increase from 1998, and positive growth rates appeared among the 
major resource rich countries even before the major spike in oil prices in 2004.  
It is useful to distinguish between three types of factors that impact on 
growth performance ranging from the short to the longer run; see Murshed (2004) 
for an overview. They are respectively, (a) short-term macroeconomic policy 
encompassing inflation (monetary policy), exchange rate volatility (monetary 
policy), terms of trade fluctuations (purely exogenous and not a policy variable) 
and the size of government expenditure (fiscal policy); (b) more structural factors, 
including the trade policy stance, the size of external and internal debt, financial 
deepening and the productivity of capital (which may depend on infrastructure 
and skills accumulation); (c) the role of institutions, covering the polity and 
quality of governance. The first two determine the proximate causes of growth: 
investment in physical and capital, factor accumulation, and their productivity. 
The last factor constitutes the deep determinant of growth; without the right 
institutional setting investment will not take place (for example, if the risk of 
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appropriation is high), and the right policies will never be adopted (in a factional 
state, for instance, only the interests of certain groups will be served).   
 
Table 1: Annual Average Growth of Real Per Capita GDP (%)  
Constant 2000 USD 
COUNTRY 1961-
1970 
1971-
1980 
1981-
1990 
1991-
2000 
2001-
2004 
2001-
2005 
Algeria 2.8 4.6 -0.2 -0.2 3.3 3.4 
Bahrain   -1.8 2.4 3.9 4.2 
Comoros   0.3 -0.9 0.3 0.6 
Djibouti    -4.2 0.7 0.8 
Egypt 2.7 4.5 3.0 2.4 1.5 1.8 
Iran   -0.9 2.2 4.4 4.1 
Jordan   -1.6 0.9 3.4 3.7 
Kuwait  -7.6  -1.9 3.3 3.7 
Lebanon   -1.7 5.3 3.4 2.7 
Libya 15.9 -1.6     
Mauritania 4.3 -0.8 -0.6 0.3 0.6 0.9 
Morocco 2.7 2.5 1.7 0.9 3.0 2.5 
Oman 14.9 1.1 4.5 1.7 2.5  
Saudi Arabia  6.6 -5.6 0.0 0.6 1.3 
Sudan -0.6 0.5 -0.002 3.3 3.8 4.2 
Syria 1.2 6.0 -1.2 2.4 1.1 1.4 
Tunisia 2.8 4.5 1.2 3.1 3.6 3.5 
Turkey  1.5 2.3 1.8 2.5 3.2 
United Arab Emirates   -4.8 -1.8 0.6 1.5 
Yemen   0 1.5 0.3 0.1 
MENA   0.5 1.7 2.2 2.3 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
  -0.7 1.7 0.6 1.1 
South Asia   3.4 3.3 4.2 4.8 
East Asia and Pacific   5.9 7.3 7.3 7.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -0.9 -0.4 1.6 1.9 
Source: World Bank, WDI 2006 
 
Short-run macroeconomic policies that cause inflation, or distort the 
nominal exchange rate, may deter investment and growth. Real exchange rate 
appreciation is common with Dutch Disease type phenomenon1 (natural resource 
                                                 
1 The Dutch Disease effect refers to a natural resource boom, which contracts the economy’s 
traded sector relative to its non-traded sector. The mechanism is a rise in the relative price of non-
traded goods and real exchange rate appreciation. This is known as the resource re-allocation 
effect. It is also accompanied by an increase in aggregate private and public spending.   
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rent booms), and are the crucial mechanism in crowding out traditional exports by 
making their prices abroad more expensive, as discussed in Murshed (2004) 
Fiscal deficits (depending on government consumption relative to revenues) can 
be inflationary when monetised; they can also exert an adverse effect on growth if 
the government’s borrowing from the private sector crowds out private 
investment. A large public sector may also be symptomatic of Dutch Disease in 
oil exporting economies, reflecting the switch in output towards non-traded goods 
and services. General government consumption can also retard growth, if the 
taxes levied to cover public spending are distortionary.  
In the more medium-term there are number of structural reforms to 
consider, which may aid growth. These include the trade policy stance, and how 
open the economy is, because buoyant exports (especially of manufactured goods 
whose demand is income elastic) can act as a spur towards general growth. Here 
we have to carefully distinguish between outcomes (the measured share of 
international trade in GDP) and policies which gauge the restrictiveness of the 
trade regime. The latter is clearly more important for growth. Most oil-rich GCC 
countries maintain a very open trade policy stance; other more diversified 
economies (such as Syria, Egypt and the Maghreb countries) have had more 
protective trade policies. Unsustainable internal and/or external debt stocks can 
also hamper growth, due to the burden of debt servicing which may divert 
resources away from growth promoting activities. The degree to which financial 
liberalisation is permitted determines first the degree of financial intermediation, 
and ultimately the supply of credit to the private sector. This is most important, 
both for harnessing savings, and also for the process of directing these into 
productive investment. In this connection, rigid state control of commercial banks 
may hinder financial deepening, and the supply of credit for investment; but 
equally hasty financial liberalisation without adequate prudential regulation can 
cause financial and exchange rate crises when things go wrong, as was evident in 
East Asia during 1997, particularly in Indonesia. There are various factors that 
can promote the productivity of capital, usually measured as total factor 
productivity. These include the presence of infrastructure such as roads and 
telecommunications, but also human development measured in terms of both 
health and education outcomes, as well as the quality of institutions.  
In the final analysis we have the impact of institutions in determining 
long-term growth rates. This has been emphasised, for example, by Acemoglu, 
Robinson and Johnson (2005). Institutions of importance mainly relate to 
governance measures (including those that facilitate or hinder private enterprise), 
but the overall polity (quality of democracy) may be also be important. So, how 
does the region fare in terms of various indicators; secondly, what are their 
relative values as drivers of growth in the region. 
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Starting off with inflation, Hakura (2004) points out that inflation in the 
MENA region was about the same as in the high growth East Asian economies, 
and usually below the 7-11% danger zone identified by the IMF. Furthermore, in 
Hakura’s cross-sectional regression of growth determinants in the 1980 to 2000 
period, covering 10 MENA countries (including major oil exporting GCC 
economies), as well as nations outside the MENA region for the purposes of 
comparison, the negative contribution of inflation is present but statistically 
insignificant. With regard to the negative effects of real exchange rate over-
valuation, Hakura (2004) finds that it has a small and significantly negative 
impact on growth, except when the oil rich GCC countries are excluded. This, 
points to some evidence of Dutch Disease type effects due to the oil booms of the 
1970s lingering in GCC countries. Similarly, the ratio of government 
consumption to GDP retards growth, except during the 1990s, and when the 
presence of conflict is taken into account. This suggests that conflict puts upward 
pressure on government spending, with negative growth effects. Volatility in the 
terms of trade has little explanatory power in determining growth in the sample of 
countries considered. No control, however, is present for the special effects of 
MENA (or MENA oil) region is made in the regressions in this study.   
The study by Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2007) of the determinants 
of growth (1980-2000) in the MENA region and other countries does not incorporate 
the major Gulf oil exporters. It, however, has innovative properties, including the use 
of principal components analysis to identify and rank the chief determinants of 
growth. They develop a hybrid concept of macroeconomic stability comprising 
inflation, the public sector budget deficit, and the presence or absence of black 
market premia in the foreign exchange market. The overall position regarding 
macroeconomic stability improved in the 1990s, compared to the 1980s when they 
were growth retarding effects on all three counts in Iran, Syria and Algeria. 
Problems are said to remain in Iran, Algeria and Syria with regard to the black 
market premium on foreign exchange, along with inflation in Iran, Algeria, Egypt 
and Syria, and budget deficits in Tunisia and Morocco.  The study has a separate 
explanatory variable for growth described as external stability composed of two 
components, the debt stock as a proportion of GDP and the current account of the 
balance of payments as a percentage of exports of goods and services. This was a 
major issue in MENA countries from the 1980s, and may have cost the MENA 
countries studied in Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2007) about 1% of per-
capita GDP growth per annum in the 1980 to 2000 period.  All in all, their principal 
components analysis of growth determinants suggests that internal and external 
macroeconomic problems may have cost these MENA countries annually -2.2% of 
GDP per capita between 1980 to 1989, but after reforms they may have contributed 
1.4% per year to growth during the 1990s.   
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Table 2 illustrates patterns of government consumption as a proportion of 
GDP between 1970 and 2005. The region is characterised by large government 
spending as a proportion of national income. This figure size is quite resilient in the 
oil economies of the region, whereas it has been declining in recent years in the more 
diversified countries without conflict such as Egypt and Jordan, as well as Algeria, 
clearly following the structural reforms mentioned above.  
 
Table 2: General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Algeria 16.5 14.4 15.2 16.7 16.1 16.8 14.1 7.2 
Bahrain .. .. 13.0 22.8 24.2 20.8 17.6 .. 
Egypt 24.7 24.9 15.7 17.2 11.3 10.5 10.9 12.7 
Iran .. 24.2 20.8 15.5 11.1 12.0 13.9 13.5 
Jordan .. .. 28.8 26.3 24.9 17.1 17.0 16.0 
Kuwait 13.6 11.1 11.2 22.4 38.7 32.2 21.5 .. 
Lebanon .. .. .. .. 24.6 9.8 17.6 15.2 
Libya 18.2 27.6 21.8 .. 24.4 22.3 20.5 .. 
Oman 12.8 31.6 25.0 27.1 22.3 25.1 20.7 .. 
Saudi Arabia 17.0 14.6 15.9 31.9 29.2 23.6 26.0 23.1 
Syria 17.5 21.1 23.2 23.8 14.3 13.4 11.2 .. 
Tunisia 16.9 14.6 14.5 17.0 16.4 16.9 15.6 14.4 
United Arab 
Emirates .. 8.3 10.9 19.6 16.3 16.4 15.4 .. 
West Bank and 
Gaza .. .. .. .. .. 18.9 37.4 .. 
Yemen .. .. .. .. 17.5 14.4 12.7 12.9 
East Asia & 
Pacific 8.6 8.6 13.9 12.9 11.7 10.7 11.2 .. 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 12.9 14.6 14.7 16.5 17.4 15.3 16.0 17.3 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 10.0 11.1 10.3 10.3 11.6 14.0 14.8 13.2 
MENA .. 22.3 18.8 17.5 15.0 14.4 14.9 13.2 
Source: World Bank, WDI 2006 
 
Table 3 gives us a picture of the evolution of the external debt stock and 
the total stock of domestic government debt respectively. MENA external 
indebtedness is below the levels of most low-income African economies, but 
higher than several East Asian economies. It has to be borne in mind that Egypt 
benefited from external debt forgiveness after the 1991 Gulf War, similar to 
Mexico and Poland during the late 1980s. The external debt position of Egypt has 
worsened recently due to balance of payments problems. In most MENA 
countries external debt rose during the 1980s and early 1990s, but declined 
afterwards. These stocks are still high in the Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Tunisia. 
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As far as government debt is concerned (Table 4), it is interesting to note 
that the recent oil boom has led to the reduction of total government debt in most 
GCC oil rich countries except Bahrain, mitigating any potential Dutch Disease 
effects of the recent oil booms. The more diversified economies, however, have 
not improved their government indebtedness positions, except for Jordan from a 
highly adverse position. The level of government debt is of concern in Syria, 
Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, as it is above or near the 60% level of GDP 
considered imprudent under the Maastricht criterion for European monetary 
union. Egypt has very high and unsustainable government debt that is well above 
100% of GDP, as has Lebanon where the level of government debt before the 
2006 Israeli invasion was at a staggering and unsustainable 175% of GDP.  
In the oil rich GCC sub-region, Auty (2001) points to three factors that may 
have caused the growth collapse of the 1980s and early 1990s, especially in Saudi 
Arabia. First, there was an overestimation of the economy’s ability to absorb the 
huge oil rents compared to per-capita GDP. Granted a great deal was saved and 
invested abroad, but excessive amounts of the oil rents were invested 
unproductively, more than would be warranted by economic size. Secondly, the real 
exchange rate appreciation following the 1970s oil booms was allowed to persist 
even after the decline in oil prices in the early 1980s. This may have exacerbated 
‘Dutch Disease’ type effects. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, there was fiscal 
imprudence along with a bloated public sector, which led to cumulatively increasing 
indebtedness in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. According to Hakura (2004) this factor, 
along with high initial per-capita incomes in 1980 are the main reasons behind the 
poor growth performance of GCC countries. Taken together, these two phenomena 
are symptoms of the spending and resource re-allocation effects of Dutch Disease. 
These factors can be said to have hindered economic diversification and competitive 
industrialisation in the Gulf. Balanced against these policy errors, are the positive 
policy choices to do with the fact that most GCC countries continue to remain very 
open economies, and either invested their oil surpluses in overseas financial markets 
and/or for the development of domestic infrastructure and human capital.  Eifert, 
Gelb and Tallroth (2002), as well as Auty and Gelb (2001) discuss the special 
‘paternalistic’ political economy of the Gulf oil rich countries, which make it 
difficult to curtail public expenditure and the size of the public sector without 
potentially jeopardising the unique societal stability that characterises these 
countries. The growth retarding effects of a large government consumption share in 
GDP have to be contrasted with the positive effect of public sector employment and 
expenditure on social harmony and conflict prevention. 
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Table 3: External Debt Stocks as a % of GDP (current US$) 
 
COUNTRY 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Algeria 46 32 45 79 47 26 
Egypt 83 104 77 56 29 38 
Iran 5 3 7 23 8 8 
Jordan 47 77 207 114 87 71 
Lebanon   63 27 59 101 
Morocco 52 125 97 72 62 35 
Oman 10 23 23 42 33 16 
Saudi Arabia    16.1 11.0 
Sudan 68 72 112 245 133 89 
Syria 27 66 140 188 120 86 
Tunisia 40 58 63 60 58 66 
Yemen   132 147 54 43 
MENA 29 34 50 50 32 30 
Sources: World Bank, WDI 2006; IMF (2006) 
Table 4: Government Debt Stocks (% of GDP) 
COUNTRY 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Algeria .. 99.6 63.6           28.5 
Bahrain 8.7 17.0 29.3 30.3 
Egypt   82.0 112.5 
Iran   28.3 17.4 
Jordan 133.3 105.1 93.7 84.7 
Kuwait   40.0 13.1 
Libya         33.7            1.2 
Lebanon .. 78.5     144.8         174.6 
Morocco 102.1 80.7      77.8           70.5 
Oman 19.6 27.4 19.1           10.8 
Qatar   59.9           30.5 
Saudi Arabia   96.7 39.6 
Syria   62.9 60.2 
Tunisia 54.8 57.7 62.6 55.9 
MENA average   64.8 45.9 
Notes: (a) 2000 figures for Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and the MENA region are the average for 1998-
2002; (b) Data for Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Tunisia refer to general government. 
Sources: World Bank WDI 2006, IMF (2006) 
 
Reverting back to the non-GCC countries of the region, Nabli and 
Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2007) find that structural reforms (open trade policies, 
financial liberalisation and so on) do not yield growth dividends unless preceded, or 
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accompanied, by measures to promote macroeconomic stability. In contrast, 
macroeconomic adjustment, even in the absence of structural reforms, yields some 
growth dividends. With regard to the openness, Hakura (2004) does not find the total 
trade to GDP ratio significantly affects growth. But that is an outcome measure. 
Using the Sachs and Warner (1995) measures of openness, Makdisi, Fattah and 
Limam (2000) find that it is significant in explaining growth in a cross section of 
countries including MENA countries, but as is now well known, these variables 
could be picking up effects of institutional quality.  
Hakura (2004) points out that human capital endowments measured by 
secondary school enrolment were high in the region by developing country 
standards, so it cannot be a major growth retarding factor in the MENA region.2 
According to Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2007), human development and 
infrastructure exert about an equally important effect in growth generation in the 
region. The combined role of human development and infrastructure (roads and 
telecommunications), along with structural reforms was about 2.7% during 1980-89, 
and 2.1% in 1990-99, according to their growth decomposition and principal 
component analysis.  
The savings rates in the MENA region are not below those for many other 
developing countries outside Asia (Murshed, 2007). What matters is the productivity 
of investment. Indeed, Sala-i-Martin and Artadi (2002) point out that the 
investment rate is not always robustly correlated with growth. High investment 
rates may mask a great deal of public investment, in addition to that from private 
sources. Public investment in infrastructure may be growth enhancing, but the 
financing of this expenditure could have distortionary and negative effects on 
growth. The productivity of investment depends to a great extent on the presence 
of complementary factors such as skilled labour and infrastructure, as indicated in 
the work of Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2007). Furthermore, Sala-i-Martin 
and Artadi (2002) indicate that despite the fact that secondary enrolment has been 
high in the MENA region its quality may leave much to be desired.  Growth can 
take place due to the accumulation of factors of production (capital and labour), 
something referred to as extensive growth, and/or due to the augmentation of the 
productivity of these factors of production over time (intensive growth). The latter is 
measured by a variable known as total factor productivity (TFP) growth. ESCWA 
(2005), reports that only five MENA countries, Egypt, Oman, Morocco, Syria and 
Tunisia registered positive TFP growth in the 1980-2000 period.  
 
                                                 
2 In empirical growth analysis countries starting out with higher human capital (skills and 
education) in the initial year of the growth period under scrutiny usually enjoy higher growth 
rates.   
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3 Human and Institutional Development 
 
Table 5 provides us with an overview of the current state of human development 
in the MENA, drawn from the UNDP’s (2006) human development report. The 
cornerstone of this approach is the human development index, which is an 
unweighted or equal weighted average of income per-capita adjusted for the cost 
of living, longevity (including child and maternal mortality rates) and educational 
status (a hybrid of adult literacy and tiered educational enrolment). I also present 
data on the annual average growth in per-capita income and the GINI coefficient 
of income inequality where data is available, along with a measure of educational 
achievement and life expectancy at birth. MENA countries fare moderately well 
in human development. The HDI rankings of countries in the Gulf (particularly in 
Saudi Arabia) are bound to rise when growth rejuvenates, and if there are further 
improvements in the education index, which will imply catching up to the levels 
of richer East Asian countries such as Singapore and South Korea. Data on 
inequality are not available for GCC countries, where it is reasonable to assume 
that abject income poverty does not exist. The more diversified economies in the 
region do well in terms of measured inequality, as many as are egalitarian as 
countries in East and South Asia. Also, achievements in terms of education, 
longevity and reducing health inequalities are impressive (Murshed, 2007).  
 
Table 5: Human Development Indicators for Selected Countries in 2006 
COUNTRY HDI 
rank 
Annual % 
growth of per-
capita income: 
1975-2004 
GINI 
(2006) 
Education 
Index 
Life 
Expectancy 
at birth 
(2000-05) 
Kuwait 33 -0.8 --- 0.87 76.8 
Qatar 46 --- --- 0.85 72.7 
UAE 49 -2.8 --- 0.71 77.9 
Libya 64 --- --- 0.86 73.4 
Saudi Arabia 76 -2.3 --- 0.72 71.6 
Jordan 86 0.5 38.8 0.86 71.2 
Tunisia 87 2.3 39.8 0.75 73.1 
Iran 96 -0.1 43.0 0.75 70.2 
West Bank & Gaza 
 
100 --- --- 0.89 72.4 
Syria 107 1.1 --- 0.74 73.2 
Egypt 111 2.6 34.4 0.73 69.6 
Morocco 123 1.4 39.5 0.54 69.5 
Yemen 150 --- 33.4 0.51 60.3 
Notes: HDI rank goes from 1-177, with 1 as the highest, and 177 as the lowest. 
GINI ranges from 0 to 100; 0 implying no inequality and 100 the most unequal.  
The education index is a combination of adult literacy, as well as the combined primary, 
secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratios.   
Sources: UNDP (2006), and World Bank, WDI (2006). 
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Poverty and Inequality 
 
We have seen that growth has been modest in the region, and even negative for 
the GCC countries, in the 1980 to 2000 period. Growth is only one component of 
the overall picture of human development. A fuller description requires us also to 
consider developments in the incidence of poverty, and the evolving pattern of 
income inequality. Indeed, it is in terms of poverty that the region’s performance 
has been the most impressive in the developing world.  Table 6 confirms that the 
region has the lowest incidence of abject poverty based upon the international 
comparison of US $ 1 a day per person in purchasing power parity terms (PPP).3 
True, East and South Asian nations have made large strides in poverty reduction, 
but MENA countries4 have also continued to maintain their low poverty incidence 
despite very modest growth rates in the two decades following 1980.  
 
Table 6: Regional Poverty and Inequality Trends  
Region Poverty head count  
as a % of the population:  
PPP $1 day 
GINI Income share  
Poorest Quintile 
 Average 
1980s 
Average 
1990s 
% 
Change 
Average 
1980s 
Average 
1990s 
% 
Change 
Average 
1980s 
Average 
1990s 
% 
Change 
East Asia 23.7 14.9 -37.2 40 40 0.2 6.9 6.4 -7.3 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
21.2 14.9 -29.7 50 48 -2.7 3.7 4.3 16.2 
MENA 1.7 2.0 17.6 40 36 -10.1 6.5 7.5 15.4 
South 
Asia 
36.0 32.9 -8.7 31 34 8.0 8.7 8.4 -3.5 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
24.6 42.2 71.5 41 45 8.7 5.8 5.3 -8.7 
Sources: Adams and Page (2003) and WDI (2006)  
 
Secondly, as Adams and Page (2003) point out the MENA region along 
with South Asia are low income inequality countries within the developing world, 
as measured by the GINI coefficient in table 6. Gradstein, Milanovic and Ying 
(2001) point out that Islamic countries are the most “intrinsically equal” after 
controlling for per-capita income and the political system. It also appears that 
MENA countries, along with Latin America, are the two regions in the developing 
world to have actually reduced income inequality. The reduction in inequality is, 
                                                 
3 PPP measures are based on 1993 dollars and adjust for cost of living differences for a basket of 
goods across countries. An alternative measure is based on PPP $2 a day. These two measures can 
be utilized for cross country differences in poverty incidence, as national poverty standards vary 
considerably across countries and can only be utilized in the context of that particular country.  
4 Poverty analysis requires data from household surveys. These are available in the MENA region 
in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and to a lesser extent in Yemen.  
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however, greater in MENA compared to Latin America. The MENA region also 
managed to increase the income share of the poorest quintile (20%) of the 
population. 
Thus, a major contrast begins to become discernable between the MENA 
region’s experience and that of fast growing East and South Asia. In the latter, 
growth proceeded rapidly with a sharp decline in poverty. This was, however, 
accompanied with rising inequality. In the MENA countries growth was very low 
(practically non-existent in the 1980s), but inequality declined and poverty did not 
rise by much. Indeed, as pointed out by Adams and Page (2003), as well as Iqbal 
(2006), poverty actually fell during the growth slowdown of the 1980s, and only 
increased moderately thereafter. Indeed, in the famous World Bank poverty report 
(2001, figure 3.4), which extolled the virtues of growth being good for the poor, 
the MENA region was found to be the only developing world region which had 
falling poverty along with declining growth.   
What accounts for this anomaly? Before going into the explanation for this 
phenomenon it is worthwhile reminding ourselves about the notions of pro-poor 
growth, and growth-poverty decompositions. As Kakwani and Pernia (2000), and 
Ravallion and Datt (1991) indicate growth influences poverty through two 
channels. Growth lowers poverty, as long as all incomes, including the incomes of 
the poor, go up as a result. Growth can raise all boats, including the poor, even if 
the rich benefit more from the growth. Secondly, there is an effect from the 
income distribution, which typically changes with growth. If growth lowers 
income inequality or the share of the bottom quintile of the population then 
poverty will decline. Kakwani and Pernia (2000) describe this as pro-poor growth. 
This is the growth that reduces poverty by not only raising incomes but by also 
altering the distribution of income in favour of the poor. By implication, nations 
with a lower initial inequality require a lower rate of growth to reduce poverty by 
a certain percentage, compared to other countries with greater initial inequality.  
Adams and Page (2003) attribute the region’s falling poverty even after 
the growth slowdown in the 1980s up to the end of that decade, to two factors: (a) 
the presence of worker remittances from the Gulf and Western Europe, and (b) the 
large share of government employment in the region (see also table 2 on 
government consumption). Among the less affluent nations of the region, 
migration to the Gulf (from Egypt and other nations in the Mashreq), and to 
Europe from the North African Maghreb countries kept up remittances and 
checked poverty. The larger than average size of government employment by 
developing country standards in this region also acted as a poverty alleviating 
cushion, and as governments re-structured or downsized in the 1990s, this avenue 
of insurance against poverty closed down. Iqbal (2006) has pointed out that large 
government size may actually increase poverty in the longer-run by retarding 
growth due to the distortionary effects of financing government expenditure. To 
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these two factors we may add the Islamic charitable practices of zakat and sad’qa, 
which create private social responsibility, and have a poverty lowering impact 
(Sala-i-Martin and Artadi, 2002).  Zakat is not insubstantial, as it amounts to 2.5% 
of a person’s wealth (less his dwelling) and trading income, also including 
percentages of agricultural income depending on harvests. 
Adams and Page (2003) discover that once the level of income and 
inequality are controlled for the MENA region has its actual poverty level 
significantly below what would be predicted in a cross-country regression, which 
include several other non-MENA countries. Thus, the MENA region is ready for 
pro-poor growth because it has demonstrated this ability it in the past. In East and 
South Asia, growth was accompanied by rising inequality, the opposite must have 
occurred in the MENA region, and as has been pointed out poverty continued 
declining during periods of negative growth in the 1980s. In the four countries 
(Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Iran) analysed by Adams and Page (2003) the 
redistributive aspect (improved income distribution) lowered poverty in all the 
countries except Morocco. In Egypt, where it is possible to get a poverty 
breakdown between rural and urban areas, the rise in rural poverty is mainly 
attributable to rising income inequality. By contrast, urban poverty and overall 
poverty levels declined due to increased incomes. Poverty is more prevalent in 
rural areas. Interestingly, female-headed households in the MENA region showed 
no systematic tendency to be poorer, unlike in other parts of the developing world 
(Iqbal, 2006). This was especially so in Egypt, where the poverty rate for female-
headed households is lower nationally.           
 
Table 7: Progress in Poverty Headcount Reduction by Region 
Region 1990  
($1 a day) 
2002 
($1 a day) 
1990 
($2 a day) 
2002 
($2 a day) 
East Asia 29.6 11.6 --- --- 
Europe and Central 
Asia 
0.0 2.1 4.9 16.1 
LAC 11.3 8.9 28.4 23.4 
MENA 2.3 1.6 21.4 19.9 
South Asia 41.3 31.2 ---- ---- 
Sub-Saharan Africa 44.6 44.0 ----- ---- 
Source: www.worldbank.org
 
Table 7 presents recent trends in poverty reduction in various regions of 
the developing world. It confirms a continuing trend of poverty reduction, and the 
fact that the $1 a day poverty line is largely inapplicable to the MENA region, 
which has the lowest poverty rate at the $2 a day PPP measure for any developing 
region outside Europe.  
Iqbal (2006) points out that even when poverty reduction declined in the 
region during the 1990s the direction of human development improvements did 
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not go into reverse, but continued improving. Controlling for initial conditions 
(such as initial literacy rate, life expectancy and infant mortality) the region has 
performed well in this regard compared to many other comparable countries in 
high growth East Asia. The region, despite its perceived anti-female Islamic 
orientation performed better in terms of female education (especially Egypt, Libya 
and the Yemen) compared to many countries in East Asia and Latin America 
(Iqbal, 2006). Demographic and health surveys have been conducted in Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco and the Yemen. In Jordan, health inequalities between the rich 
and the poor are the lowest of the four countries surveyed. In Egypt, where two 
surveys have been conducted, health inequalities appear to have declined between 
survey periods. 
  
Institutional Quality 
 
Table 8: Governance indicators for selected countries in MENA region, 2005 
 Governance 
Indicator 
Jordan Egypt Saudi Arabia Syria MENA-East Asia 
Voice and 
Accountability
27.5 18.4 4.3 5.8 (24.8)-(50.8) 
Political 
Stability/No 
Violence
35.8 21.2 26.4 20.3 (35.0)-(61.3) 
Government 
Effectiveness
57.9 43.1 41.6 8.6 (45.0)-(49.6) 
 
 
 
 
Percentile 
Rank 
(0-100) 
Regulatory 
Quality
57.9 34.7 52.5 10.4 (41.8)-(46.9) 
62.3 54.6 57.5 42.5 (50.3)-(55.2) Rule of Law
 
Control of 
Corruption
65.5 43.3 62.6 36.9 (52.1)-(46.8) 
Voice and 
Accountability
-0.74 -1.15 -1.72 -1.67 (-0.91)-(0.04)  
Political 
Stability/No 
Violence
-0.31 -0.90 -0.70 -0.91 (-0.51)-(0.39) 
 
 
 
Government 
Effectiveness
+0.08 -0.35 -0.38 -1.23 (-0.21)—(-0.05) 
 
Estimate 
(-2.5 to  
Regulatory 
Quality
+0.16 -0.47 -0.01 -1.22 (-0.28)-(0.11) + 2.5) 
+0.43 +0.02 +0.20 -0.42 (-0.04)-(0.16) Rule of Law
 
Control of 
Corruption
+0.33 -0.42 +0.23 -0.59 (-0.01)-(-0.13) 
Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2006: Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996-2005.
 
Table 8 lists the percentile ranking, as well as the actual scores of the six 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) measures of governance for various 
countries in the region, and the region as a whole compared to East Asia. It is well 
known that East Asia is the fastest growing region of the world, compared to the 
modest growth performance of MENA countries. But does East Asia have vastly 
superior governance indicators? Note that that the percentile ranking places the 
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country or region’s position on an international scale of 0-100. The actual score, 
or estimate, ranges from -2.5 (worst) to +2.5 (best). Developed countries are 
included in the entire sample. What is immediately apparent is that although the 
region does not perform very well with regard to voice and accountability (mainly 
about democratic development and the infrequent or limited nature of the electoral 
process in the region) and political instability (reflecting regional insecurity and 
conflict), it does better on the control of corruption and the rule of law, where the 
regional position is above the world median level. Even with regard to regulatory 
quality and government effectiveness, arguably the most important indicators of 
economic governance, the region does reasonably well. Most importantly, it is not 
too far off East Asia’s position, except in terms of voice and accountability and 
political instability, for obvious reasons. East Asian countries are at present more 
successful in their democratic transition, and the security situation is far more 
propitious there. In terms of control of corruption, the MENA position is superior 
to East Asia. Jordan’s achievements with regard to the rule of law, control of 
corruption, regulatory quality and government effectiveness, indicators of ‘hard’ 
governance are noteworthy.      
 
Table 9: POLITY 2, Combined Democracy-Autocracy Scores 
COUNTRY 1980 2000 COUNTRY 1980 2000 
Bahrain -10 -7 Nigeria 7 4 
Djibouti -8 2 Oman -10 -9 
Egypt -6 -6 Qatar -10 -10 
Ghana 6 2 Saudi Arabia -10 -10 
India 8 9 South Africa 4 9 
Indonesia -7 7 Sudan -7 -7 
Iran -2 3 Syria -9 -7 
Iraq -9 -9 Tunisia -9 2 
Jordan -10 -2 Turkey -5 -7 
Kenya -6 -2 UAE -8 -8 
Korea South -8 8 Venezuela 9 3 
Kuwait -10 -7 Yemen  -2 
Libya -7 -7 Yemen North -6  
Malaysia 4 3 Yemen South -8  
Mexico -3 8    
Source: Polity IV Project (Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management), http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity. 
 
 
Table 9 gives us the Polity 2 score on democracy versus autocracy, which ranges 
from -10 (the highest autocracy score) to +10 (the maximum democracy score). 
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The democratic credentials of the region are not very strong. One might be 
tempted to attribute this effect to Arab-Muslim culture, as many respected 
commentators have done, Kedourie (1992) for example. What may matter more 
than Islam are the oil endowments in many countries of the region. Ross (2001) 
finds that countries rich in oil are slower on their traverse towards democracy. 
The reasons he identifies are the following. There is a lack of “modernisation” as 
economic wealth does not translate into social and cultural change. Secondly, 
there is a repression effect, mineral and oil rich states can engage in higher levels 
of military and internal security expenditure to suppress internal dissent. Thirdly, 
there is a rentier effect. Revenues from oil and mineral resources create rents that 
can be utilised to bribe the population into silence regarding authoritarianism. 
Fourthly, public goods may be provided along side low taxes because resource 
rents are the main source of revenue for the state. Taxation normally results in 
pressures to introduce democractic accountability.    
Two points are of importance here. First, the region exhibits a substantial 
degree of regime stability, compared to the rest of Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America. The literature suggests that regime instability not only enhances 
the risk of internal conflict (Murshed, 2006 provides a review), but it can also 
hamper growth. Secondly, the low democracy scores in the region are mainly 
attributable to the fact that elections are less frequent in the region. This does not 
always necessarily imply rule without consent. Many countries with imperfect and 
flawed electoral systems tend to do well on the Polity democracy score.  
Noland’s (2008a) cross country econometric study on the determinants of 
democracy (measured by the Polity score) does not find a robustly significant 
negative effect of Islam on democratic outcomes. He, however, finds that a 
dummy variable for the Arab population share retards democratic development, 
and the chances of liberalizing transitions towards democracy (Noland, 2008b). 
Thus, it is not Islam per se, but certain Arab characteristics that retard democratic 
development. Unlike Ross (2001), he finds this to be the case even after 
controlling for the presence of oil.  
Three important caveats should, however, be borne in mind. First of all, 
measures like Polity are heavily biased towards process, and are not an outcome 
based measure of governance or human development, say. The paucity of 
elections and the absence of written checks and balances will lead to a low Polity 
score for many countries in the region. Traditional Arab consultative practices are 
widely unknown or misunderstood in the West. Rawls (1999) in his Law of 
Peoples mentions three types of societies besides liberal democracies in the 
following descending order of desirability: conservative systems with consultative 
bodies and associations, benevolent absolutisms that are respectful of human 
rights and outright rogue states. Western style elections may even be more 
frequent in rogue states; something that may secure them a higher Polity score as 
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indicated above. Secondly, there are major endogeneity (reverse causality) issues 
connected with democracy and its exogenous determinants, such as modernization 
and conflict. The apparent undemocratic nature of the region could be attributed 
more to its geo-political salience for the West. Western interests in this region 
may be better guaranteed by absolutist-dynastic rule, especially in the light of the 
potential anti-Western policies that democracy may generate. Thirdly, Noland 
(2008a) points out that the lack of gender empowerment in the region may also 
hinder democratic transitions. There are many ways of measuring gender 
empowerment, such as women’s participation in paid employment, and the 
proportion of female legislators. Ross (2008) demonstrates that Islamic culture 
does not retard women’s participation in the labour force and in politics, but once 
again the presence of oil lowers women’s involvement in politics and work 
outside the home or farm. Another, more fundamental way of looking at women’s 
empowerment is the male-female population ratio; this according to Noland’s 
study (2008a) promotes democracy. While the MENA region may not be viewed 
favourably in terms of gender rights, yet this part of the world is not notorious for 
‘daughter’ elimination, and does not have unfavourable sex ratios as a result of 
these practices, unlike in many parts of India (Srinivasan and Bedi, 2008) or 
China. India, of course, has always had the highest Polity democracy score of any 
developing country.5
 
4 The Recent Oil Boom 
 
Graph 1 illustrates trends in oil prices, which after their peak in 1980, declined 
until 1998, from when they picked up. Table 10 gives us the percentage decline in 
real oil rents (in 1990 prices) for several countries between the peak in 1980 and 
their decline thereafter, up to the partial recovery in 2000. Rent refers to the 
difference between extraction costs and the world price of oil. When this figure is 
multiplied with the quantity produced, the value of oil rents is arrived at. Syria, as 
a relatively minor exporter is the only country with an increase in the value of the 
real oil rent. In Saudi Arabia, the share of oil and gas rents in GNP halved from 
their level of 85% in 1980 to about 43% by 1994 (Auty, 2001, Table 12.1).6 From 
around 1998 the oil price has been rising, and consequently the oil rent is 
increasing for major producers. The recent terms of trade for Algeria, Iran, Syria, 
Saudi and Kuwait are plotted in graph 2, showing an improvement (fall) after 
2002. 
                                                 
5 Stewart (2008) points out that in India maternal and infant mortality rates are lower among the 
Muslim minority who are otherwise socio-economically and politically disadvantaged.  
6 In Saudi Arabia, by 2000, the real value of total oil sales declined to about 36% of their 1980 real 
value; own calculations based on SAMA, 
http://www.sama.gov.sa/newreports/annual/en/section10/indexe.htm. 
 
 
 
17
 
 
 
Graph 1: Nominal Oil Prices 1970- 2008
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In the past, growth patterns varied greatly amongst the region’s large oil 
producers (World Bank, 2006). After 1992, however, the business cycle in GCC 
countries is more coordinated and moves together. Also, there is a positive 
correlation between oil prices and growth for all GCC countries, and other oil 
exporters, Algeria, Iran, Syria and Libya. In the 1968-92 period the correlation 
between growth and oil prices was negative for Saudi Arabia, for Bahrain and 
Qatar during the 1980-92 period, and for Iran during 1968 to 1980. 
 
 
Table 10: Oil rents in Constant 1990 dollars (Selected Countries) 
COUNTRY 1980 1990 2000 % Change 
Algeria 18,044,476,450 4,192,000,939 5,155,720,218 29 
Bahrain 1,039,274,723 300,315,639 289,322,107 28 
Egypt 10,779,635,836 3,643,001,088 3,081,343,135 29 
Iran 31,319,196,688 22,437,609,287 27,833,043,654 89 
Iraq 55,358,511,605 13,932,966,311 18,868,589,828 34 
Morocco 5,397,052 1,759,989 1,641,285 30 
Syria 3,798,186,575 3,426,000,948 4,391,222,798 116 
Tunisia 2,181,332,450 522,910,532 456,766,950 21 
Source: Metcalfe (2007)    
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Graph 2: Terms of Trade 
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Table 11: Annual Percentage Real Oil and Non-Oil GDP Growth for MENA Oil Producers 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 Non-
Oil 
Oil Non-
Oil 
Oil Non-
Oil 
Oil Non-
Oil 
Oil Non-
Oil 
Oil Non-
Oil 
Oil 
Algeria 5.3 3.7 6.0 8.8 6.2 3.3 4.7 5.8 5.6 -2.5 6.0 -1.0 
Bahrain 6.0 1.3 8.3 1.1 10.7 -
11.9 
11.6 -8.8 8.0 -1.0 7.7 -4.0 
Iran 7.8 5.1 6.6 7.7 5.4 2.9 5.3 -0.4 6.2 2.7 7.0 0.9 
Iraq 0.2 -13.6 -40.2 -42.3 14.9 74.2 12.0 -8.1 7.5 5.3 -2.0 4.0 
Kuwait 13.6 -7.9 10.0 19.8 12.9 8.1 11.4 11.4 9.0 2.9 9.8 -2.3 
Libya 4.7 -0.4 2.5 26.9 2.6 5.5 15.8 7.2 10.7 4.3 14.7 1.7 
Oman  5.1 -2.1 6.0 -5.9 8.5 -1.8 7.3 2.9 8.4 2.6 9.0 -0.8 
Qatar 7.7 7.1 5.3 6.3 24.6 12.5 13.1 6.0 19.9 10.7 14.5 17.4 
Saudi 
Arabia 
3.7 -7.5 3.7 17.2 4.6 6.7 5.2 6.2 4.9 -0.8 4.9 0.5 
Syria 3.0 5.8 3.9 -7.3 5.0 -6.1 6.0 -8.6 6.5 -6.4 5.8 -7.3 
UAE 7.7 -7.6 11.2 13.6 12.6 2.9 10.8 1.6 10.4 6.5 8.8 3.5 
Source: IMF (2006, 2008) 
 
Table 11 illustrates the recent growth in oil and non-oil GDP for oil 
exporting MENA countries. In all of these countries the growth in oil GDP 
burgeoned in 2003 except in Bahrain, Oman and Syria where the oil sector is 
steadily declining. In Iraq there was a huge GDP contraction due to the war, 
which nearly halved national income. Non-oil GDP growth was faster everywhere 
in 2005 (except marginally in Algeria), and this is a trend continued except in Iraq 
in 2007. Thus, we have some prima facie evidence for there not being Dutch 
Disease type production re-allocation effects during the current oil boom. Oil 
revenues are being saved for future use not only in GCC countries, but also in 
Algeria. Another gradual development, since the 1990s, is the de-coupling of the 
region’s resource poor countries (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and others) 
from the oil price cycle (World Bank, 2006). The reasons given for this are the 
reduction in the integration of the labour markets of these countries with that of 
the GCC countries, declining financial flows from GCC countries (although it has 
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picked up recently) and rising oil bills in resource poor MENA countries, as they 
become richer. For Egypt the correlation between oil prices and growth became 
negative after 1992.  
 
Table 12:  Central Government Fiscal Balance (FB) (In percent of GDP) 
& Non-Oil Fiscal Balance (NFB) (In percent of non-oil GDP) 
1998-2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  
Countries & 
Regions FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB FB NFB 
Middle East 
& Central 
Asia 
-1.6  0.5  2.8  5.6  6.2  
Oil 
exporters  
0.2 -27.2 3.7 -31.7 6.6 -33.6 11.4 -36.0 12.1 -37.6 
 
Algeria 1.5 -29.5 7.8 -27.7 6.9 -30.3 11.9 -31.0 13.6 -36.0 
 
Bahrain  -0.6 -25.4 -2.0 -33.1 4.6 -29.3 7.6 -28.8 4.7 -28.5 
 
Iran  0.1 -16.8 -0.1 -21.8 1.7 -25.6 1.7 -24.5 0.0 -28.2 
 
Iraq      -56.0  6.5  11.0 -95.3 
 
Kuwait  20.5 -39.8 18.0 -47.5 21.2 -48.7 34.1 -39.4 30.7 -48.9 
 
Libya  5.0 -37.6 14.2 -88.9 13.9 -109.9 30.9 -158.0 35.5 -127.6 
Oman  3.9 -52.1 5.8 -56.6 4.5 -64.9 12.1 -66.5 14.2 -64.9 
 
Qatar  0.8 -50.4 4.3 -47.0 16.4 -42.6 10.8 -61.3 9.2 -41.1 
 
Saudi Arabia  -4.3 -41.9 1.2 -46.7 10.0 -46.5 18.4 -52.3 21.0 -52.7 
 
Syria  -1.1 -17.7 -2.6 -22.0 -4.2 -20.2 -4.4 -16.8 -5.7 -13.4 
 
U A E 1.6 -32.0 13.8 -28.0 10.2 -21.3 20.0 -17.3 28.6 -14.9 
Yemen  0.6  -4.8  -2.2  -1.8  1.2  
 
Egypt -3.2  -9.0  -8.3  -8.4  -9.2  
 
Jordan  -4.5  -1.0  -1.7  -5.0  -3.8  
Lebanon  -17.5  -13.2  -9.7  -8.5  -10.2  
 
Morocco  -4.5  -4.9  -3.8  -4.8  -1.4  
 
Tunisia -2.7  -3.1  -2.6  -3.0  -2.7  
 
MENA  -1.0  0.7  3.5  7.1  7.8  
GCC  -0.3  5.5  11.5  19.5  21.9  
 
Maghreb  -0.4  3.3  3.8  8.4  11.2  
Source: IMF (2006). (General government for Kazakhstan, Syria, Egypt and Tunisia). 
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To look at the expenditure side of the recent oil boom we have to first 
examine patterns of government consumption and expenditure. Table 12 
demonstrates that the non-oil fiscal balance for oil exporters is negative, and has 
grown from -27.2% of GDP in 1998-2002 to -37.6% of GDP by 2005. This is 
despite the fact that overall fiscal balances are in surplus, but without oil revenues 
a pronounced deficit would emerge. Thus, dependence on oil revenues continues 
unabated, although some moves have been made in Syria to reverse this process. 
But, on the other hand, tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that moves have been made to 
reduce external and government debt. For example, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had 
substantially reduced their government debt from 96.7% and 40% of GDP 
respectively in 2000 to 39.6% and 13.1% of GDP by 2005. The non-oil countries 
of the region have, however, seen their fiscal balances deteriorate (Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia). This is related to higher oil prices, and the cost 
of domestic subsidies in this regard. 
 
Graph 3. Real Effective Exchange Rate
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The current account of the balance of payments for non-oil countries in the 
region has worsened, with a substantial deficit in Jordan and Lebanon (IMF, 
2006b, table 15). But most importantly, for oil exporters the real exchange rate 
has not been allowed to appreciate following the oil boom, this time. In fact, 
graph 3 illustrates a real depreciation until recently. One reason for this is that 
many oil exporting currencies are linked to the US dollar, which has depreciated 
since 2002 vis-à-vis other major currencies. Thus, another avenue of adverse 
macroeconomic effects of oil booms has been plugged in the region this time 
around, unlike during the 1980s. There has been a less pronounced increase in 
domestic absorption this time unlike the 1980s (see Auty, 2001 on Saudi Arabia 
during the 1980s), including less of an import surge (IMF, 2006b). The 
investment of oil surpluses has been more diversified this time around, with major 
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inflows into projects in the Mashreq and Egypt (World Bank, 2006). With about 
two-thirds of world known oil reserves and about half of natural gas reserves in 
the region, its output is about a third of world oil and a fifth of gas. Steps have 
been taken to increase investment in oil and gas production capacity in Saudi 
Arabia.  
There has, however, been a major expansion of domestic credit (Table 13), 
mainly to the private sector. This suggests Dutch Disease effects, as some of these 
monies are utilised to finance housing and the consumption of consumer durables. 
The World Bank (2006) raises three questions in this regard. First, there are still 
outstanding issues concerning regulation, even though the regulatory institutions 
are robust in the region, there are still problems with the ownership of banks 
which tends to expose the financial sector to systemic risk. Secondly, the financial 
system is open to negative shocks via falling share prices as banks have increased 
their exposure to equity markets. Finally, outside GCC countries, the MENA 
region’s financial system seems to be the least connected to the real private sector 
in the entire world. Lending is to a select few, and on an average the region’s 
businesses rely most heavily (75%) on internally generated finance, compared to 
any other region of the world. 
 
Table 13: Growth in Domestic Credit, 2001-2005 
COUNTRY  PERCENTAGE GROWTH 
2001-2005 
Egypt 57.79 
Iran 143.51 
Jordan 76.24 
Saudi Arabia 31.33 
United Arab 
Emirates 
154.71 
Syria 40.96 
Lebanon 26.49 
Algeria -32.43 
Morocco 24.93 
Tunisia 33.18 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
 
5 Conclusions: Domestic Constraints on Growth  
 
In a nutshell, the recent economic history of the Middle East may be described as 
successful development despite modest growth rates compared to East and South 
Asia. Against this success, is the region’s singular failure to diversify the 
production structure, and successfully climb the ladder towards higher value 
added manufactured exports, unlike in Asia. Middle Eastern countries, like most 
of Latin America, are middle income countries with higher wages than in Asia. 
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They risk missing out on manufactured export led growth process, because they 
have never really exported labour intensive manufactures (unlike Asia) on a large 
enough scale, making the step towards the second (capital intensive) rung of the 
ladder more arduous for these latecomers to internationally competitive 
industrialization.  
The region has several fuel/mineral exporting economies. With regard to 
the general difficulties faced by these types of economies, or the so called 
resource curse, three points stand out. First, the resource curse is a recent (post-
1970) phenomenon. Historically, an abundance of natural resource endowments 
has been a blessing and not a curse; see Murshed (2004) for a literature review. 
Secondly, there are macroeconomic mechanisms through which resource booms 
may adversely affect the economy. These emanate from an ephemeral spending 
effect (excessive consumption), and a relative price effect (real exchange rate 
appreciation and the domestic terms of trade moving in favour of non-traded 
goods). Thirdly, large resource rents may lead to the development of an adverse 
political economy, associated with an extractive or rentier state. It has to be 
emphasised, however, that all of these problems can be avoided within a good 
institutional setting, as the experience of Norway shows, and through judicious 
policy design leading to economic diversification, as the recent economic history 
of Malaysia illustrates. The resource curse may not be a curse at all, and the Dutch 
disease may not really be a disease if a wise and prudent course is followed. 
Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that the resource curse in developing 
countries may be an artefact of the recent past (Metcalfe, 2007).  
The MENA region certainly went through a boom and bust cycle, 
associated with the peak in oil prices during the very early 1980s, and there 
subsequent decline in the mid-1980s. Growth in per-capita income fell into 
negative territory for many of the region’s economies, especially oil exporters 
during the 1980s, and the decline continued into the 1990s for many, although 
there was a recovery for others. The decline of the 1980s for major oil exporters 
had classic symptoms of Dutch Disease phenomenon associated with real 
exchange rate appreciation which persisted even after oil prices declined, 
combined with over-absorption and rising government spending which led to the 
accumulation of debt stocks. Other, non-oil based economies were in need of 
structural reforms to make their economies more open and many of these were 
subsequently implemented. Yet despite the growth slow down, poverty, where 
measured in the region, continued to decline. Not only that, but the region 
achieved a reduction in measured income inequality in contrast to high growth 
East Asia. At present it has low inequality, comparable to South and East Asia, 
and the lowest incidence of poverty for any part of the developing world outside 
Europe, which is a major achievement given that regional average per-capita 
income is below the Latin American average. Its achievements in health and 
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education were also impressive, including that for female schooling despite the 
region’s so-called Islamic anti-female orientation. Gradually, since the mid-1980s, 
the region’s resource poor and labour abundant countries economic cycles became 
more decoupled from oil prices, as these economies came to rely less on worker 
remittances from the Gulf.  
The recent oil boom has not produced profligacy. There is little evidence 
of Dutch Disease. Rather real exchange rates have not been allowed to appreciate 
despite improvements in the external terms of trade, the increase in consumption 
is less muted, there is less of an import surge, and the oil surpluses have been 
invested wisely including savings for future use, and investment inflows into the 
resource poor countries of the region. Above all, there is fiscal prudence this time 
around and oil exporting countries have been successful in substantially retiring 
stocks of national and external debt. Oil importing countries in the region have, 
however, been hit hard by the rise in oil prices both in terms of the balance of 
payments (partially offset by greater tourism and service exports), and on account 
of their domestic fuel subsidies.  
In connection with medium-term policies to promote growth, Rodrik 
(2006) has proposed a diagnostic methodology for searching for the more binding 
constraints on growth. This manner of proceeding is predicated on the fact that 
institutions (which may affect long-term growth prospects) are slow to change, 
but policy makers cannot wait for fundamental institutional improvement before 
attempting to foster economic growth and poverty reduction. In this spirit, three 
broad constraints on growth in the region have been identified in the literature.  
The first pertains to labour markets and unemployment. The MENA 
region is characterised by some of the highest rates of unemployment in the 
world, and it also has a high level of new entrants to the labour market (for 
example, 56% of Saudis are aged below 20). The unemployment problem is 
particularly acute at present in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, Egypt, Algeria and 
Morocco. Countries in the region (except Jordan) have, however, lowered 
unemployment rates below what would be predicted by comparisons with the rest 
of the world of their growth in output per-worker (World Bank, 2006, figure 1.3). 
The greatest success has been in Algeria, Morocco and Iran, but also in Saudi 
Arabia. This is a good sign, but is related to the recent oil boom. This raises 
questions regarding the sustainability of the recent achievements in 
unemployment reduction. Murshed (2007) points out that the share of public 
sector wages and salaries in total government expenditure is disproportionately 
high in the MENA region compared to other parts of the developing world, East 
Asia say; large levels of public sector employment are less robustly sustainable in 
the long-run because of fiscal exigencies. A heavy dependence on oil does little to 
create employment, as oil is notoriously capital intensive. But more importantly, 
labour productivity needs to rise along with job creation. Improvements in this 
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area require capital deepening and renewal, implying greater investment in 
manufacturing. Also, the quality of education and skill acquisition may require 
upgrading.    
This brings us to the second growth constraining issue, related to the 
efficiency of the financial sector, and its role in providing productive investment. 
The degree of financial deepening is quite high in the region, so the base for 
investment finance appears to be present. The recent oil boom had led to increases 
in liquidity, growth in domestic credit (table 13), burgeoning stock markets and a 
real estate bubble. All of these post-2002 developments point to financial Dutch 
Disease symptoms. The ratio of market capitalization to GDP grew from 26% of 
GDP in 2002 to 110% in 2005 in the MENA on an average, with burgeoning new 
IPOs (initial public offerings). This is a sign of an overheated securities market, 
along with concomitant dangers to the real economy of negative financial sector 
shocks. The real value of bank deposits increased by about 15% in the MENA 
region between 2002 and 2005 (World Bank, 2006). Corresponding to that, there 
has also been a rise in the proportion of private sector credit to GDP. But this has 
not been a universal development; it is estimated that about 40% of the population 
have not benefited from this credit growth. It is noteworthy that use of internal 
finance (rather than bank credit) in the region’s enterprises is the greatest in the 
world. This, however, means that the real effects of any financial sector shocks 
will be more muted, and indeed there is little evidence of banking crises in the 
region.     
The third, and perhaps most important, constraint on growth pertains to the 
quality of bureaucratic regulation. Murshed (2007) points out the low proportion 
of manufactured exports in total exports for even most of the resource poor 
countries of the region. The two successes in this regard are Morocco and Tunisia. 
This can be contrasted to the experience of East and South Asian economies, 
where policies of competitive industrialization were pursued leading to growth in 
manufactured exports. Non-GCC MENA countries have not properly exploited 
any potential comparative advantage in (labour or slightly more capital intensive) 
manufactured exports. In failing to do so they have missed out on the lower rungs 
of the ladder defining stages of growth and development based on gradually 
increasing the value added of exports. Most of the region’s oil exporting 
economies (except Algeria), and MENA as a whole, have negative real saving 
rates, once the rate of resource depletion is taken into account (Table 14). This 
makes economic diversification of paramount importance to future economic 
sustainability, looking forward to the time when oil and gas run out. In the 
ultimate analysis, this amounts to institutional quality and the structure within 
which policy is conducted. It has also been pointed out repeatedly that resource 
abundance can lead to the postponement or avoidance of necessary structural 
policy and institutional reforms.  
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Table 14  Adjusted Saving Rates as a Percentage of GNI in 2004 
Algeria 3.6 
Egypt 1.6 
Iran -5.6 
Iraq -6.2 
Jordan 13.5 
Kuwait -10.5 
Lebanon -9.3 
Morocco 22.3 
Oman -40.6 
Saudi Arabia -11.1 
Syria -28.4 
Tunisia 11.1 
MENA -6.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.9 
South Asia 12.4 
East Asia 23.9 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.6 
Developing Country Average 9.4 
Source: WDI, 2006 
Note: The method involves adding education expenditure as a percentage 
of national income to gross savings rates. Then, three items are deducted: 
(a) capital depreciation rates, (b) the rate of natural resource depletion, (c) 
and pollution costs.  
 
The World Bank (2006) report contains indicators related to trade policy, 
the business climate and the quality of governance. These indicators are more 
related to the formation of expectations regarding the business environment in 
connection with investment in new and risky areas. The studies present both the 
current status of various indicators in the MENA, and the region as a whole, as 
well as the pace of reforms. Three factors stand out. First, the GCC countries are 
more open in terms of their trade policy. Egypt and Jordan have made 
considerable progress in this area, but much more structural reform in trade 
policies is needed in Syria. Secondly, there is room for improvement in the 
business climate, particularly in Egypt. For example, in Egypt, Enders (2007) 
examines the binding constraints on growth finding that financial sector 
inefficiencies, government red-tape and over-taxation of the corporate sector may 
be the real binding constraints, in addition to the non-sustainability of fiscal 
deficits. Thirdly, the weakest performance in the entire region is related to one 
particular area of governance, public sector accountability, and this requires the 
most improvement. By contrast, in the UAE the IMF (2005) points to the many 
successes associated with its open product and labour markets, as well as its 
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highly developed infrastructure and business friendly policies. Of all GCC 
countries, it is the least oil dependent, and its non-oil GDP shows the highest 
average rate of growth (8%) in the GCC since 1995.  
The greatest external constraint to growth is the geo-political situation 
which adversely afflicts regional security along with multiple conflicts (Iraq, 
Lebanon, Palestine-Israel), and the possible slowdown in the global economy due 
to the global financial crises.  
Unlike oil-rich countries in other parts of the developing world the region 
is remarkably stable. It has also managed to avoid greed driven civil war over 
resource rents and wars of secession over oil and gas rents (discounting Sudan), 
placing it at variance with other parts of the developing world. This implies the 
prevalence of a viable and working social contract in most parts of the region. In 
terms of governance, the indicators for government effectiveness, rule of law and 
regulatory quality are favourable by developing country standards, including high 
growth East Asia; indeed in terms of the control of corruption the region is ahead 
of East Asia. Its scores for democratic orientation are hampered by the 
infrequency of national multi-party elections. All in all, in spite of being rich in 
resources, the institutional and human development record of the region is 
superior to many parts of the developing world, especially compared to African 
resource rich economies, and epithets such as the alleged ‘petromania’ 
characterising social development in the Middle East are largely unjustified.  
Despite widespread prejudice to the contrary, the cultural values of the 
region are not inimical to broad based development with equity. Gradstein, 
Milanovic and Ying (2001) show that across the diverse cultural/religious types in 
the world, there is the strongest built-in inequality aversion among Muslim 
majority countries. They find this, after controlling for per-capita income and 
democracy scores, which both tend to reduce inequality. They attribute this 
intrinsic inequality aversion to cultural features favouring redistribution in both 
Islamic and East Asian cultures (but more strongly in the former), which they 
argue promotes greater equality even when there is the absence of democratic 
political pressures favouring redistribution as in the Judeo-Christian world.7 They 
point to concern for the extended family as the factor responsible for this 
inequality aversion in Islamic and East Asian cultures. The neglected dimensions 
of various Islamic traditions and religious injunctions8 that foster private 
responsibility among the faithful regarding social issues such as poverty also need 
emphasizing in explaining the lower poverty and inequality outcomes in the 
MENA region and the Islamic world in general.          
                                                 
7 Following this argument, there would be greater inequality in Judeo-Christian societies without 
democracy, as their intrinsic inequality aversion is lower.  
8 For the observant Muslim, Zakat or charitable giving described above is one of the five pillars or 
central tenets of the faith.  
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